


# Two-Level Algebraic Method for Detection of Vulnerabilities in Binary Code

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**The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched the Cyber Grand Challenge to create defensive systems with purposes of automated, scalable, machine-speed detection of vulnerabilities and cyber infections.**

**MAYHEM**  
ForAllSecure team  
from Pittsburg

**XANDRA**  
TECH team  
From Ithaka  
New York

**Mechanical Phish**  
Shellphish team  
from Santa Barbara,  
California,

**ALL THESE TEAMS USE SYMBOLIC (ALGEBRAIC APPROACH)  
IN DETECTION OF VULNERABILITIES IN BINARY CODE**

## Problems:

### 1. Pattern Matching.

**Redundant.** Too many False Positive.

### 2. Simulation in isolated environment.

**Insufficient.** Deep-hidden vulnerabilities cannot be detected.

### 3. Analysis of high-level programming languages.

**Insufficient.** Security issues are on the level of third-party (non-compiled) libraries.

## **Our approach:**

Use the algebraic matching and symbolic execution of binary code model.

1. Create algebraic model of binary code.
2. Formalize the existed vulnerabilities as algebraic patterns.
3. Provide algebraic matching of given vulnerability models with binary code model and detect the vulnerability candidates.
4. Prove the reachability of the detected vulnerability by symbolic execution.

# Algebra of Behaviors

**Algebra of behaviors** was developed by D. Gilbert and A. Letichevsky (Senior) in 1997. It considers the operations over **actions** and **behaviors**.

*Prefixing* operation  $a.B$  means that action  $a$  follows behaviour  $B$ . The operation of *nondeterministic choice* of behaviours  $u + v$  establishes alternative behaviours. The algebra has three terminal constants: successful termination  $\Delta$ , deadlock  $0$ , and unknown behaviour  $\perp$ . The parallel and sequential composition are defined on the behaviors.

**Example:**

$$B0 = a1.a2.B1 + a3.B2,$$

$$B1 = a4.\Delta,$$

$$B2 = \dots$$

*The example defines the order of events. The behavior  $B0$  has two alternatives - first is two actions  $a1$  and  $a2$  and then the rest behavior  $B1$  or action  $a3$  and rest behavior  $B2$ . Behavior  $B1$  is action  $a4$  and end of behavior etc.*

# Algebra of Behaviors

Every action is also defined by a couple, namely, the **precondition** and **postcondition** of an action, given as an expression in some formal theory.

$$\textit{Action}(A,B) = (A > B) \ \&\& \ !(A == 0) \ -> B = (B + 1)/A$$

The semantic of the action presented in C-like syntax means that if precondition  $(A > B) \ \&\& \ !(A == 0)$  is true for concrete values of  $A$  and  $B$  or is satisfiable for symbolic (arbitrary) values of  $A$  and  $B$ , then we can change attribute  $B$  by the assignment  $B = (B + 1)/A$ . The action can be parametrized by the attributes used in the action's conditions.

# Translation of x86 Assembler to Algebra of Behaviors

## Listing after disassembling:

```
8049865: 2d e0 01 1d 08      sub eax,0x81d01e0
804986a: c1 f8 02            sar eax,0x2
804986d: 89 c2              mov edx,eax
8049876: 75 01              jne 8049879
```

## Model of binary code behavior:

```
B8049865 = sub(1,eax,0x81d01e0).B804986a,
B804986a = sar(1,eax,0x2).B804986d,
B804986d = mov(1,edx,eax,mov).B8049876,
B8049876 = jmp(1,jne).B8049879
```

# Translation of x86 Assembler to Algebra of Behaviors

## ALGEBRAIC ENVIRONMENT:

- the set of general- and special-purpose registers. Some attributes are identified as names of registers: *ax, al, bx, bl, ..., eax, ebx, ..., rax, rbx, ..., ebp, esp, rbp, rsp, rip*
- physical memory that can be considered as the function *Memory(addr)*, where *addr* is the available memory address

$Bx1 = \text{cjne}.Bz + !\text{cjne}.Bx2$

$Bx2 = \dots$

$\text{cjne}(n, A, B) = !(A == B) \rightarrow \text{PI} = \text{PI} + z + 3; \text{FLAG\_C} = (B > A)$


$!\text{cjne}(n, A, B) = (A == B) \rightarrow \text{PI} = \text{PI} + 3;$



# Translation of x86 Assembler to Algebra of Behaviors

## Set of Instructions is converted to

```
000000000425060 <SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file>:
 425060: 41 55          push  r13
 425062: 41 54          push  r12
 425064: 49 89 f5      mov   r13,rsi
 425067: 55           push  rbp
 425068: 53           push  rbx
 425069: 49 89 fc      mov   r12,rdi
 42506c: 89 d5        mov   ebp,edx
 42506e: 48 83 ec 08   sub   rsp,0x8
 425072: e8 d9 24 fe ff call  407550 <BIO_s_file@plt>
 425077: 48 89 c7      mov   rdi,rax
 42507a: e8 a1 31 fe ff call  408220 <BIO_new@plt>
 42507f: 48 85 c0      test  rax,rax
 425082: 0f 84 b0 00 00 je    425138
<SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file+0xd8>
 425088: 4c 89 e9      mov   rcx,r13
```



## Set of Algebra Behavior Expressions


```
B425060 = a_push_33766.B425062,
B425062 = a_push_33767.B425064,
B425064 = a_mov_33768.B425067,
B425067 = a_push_33769.B425068,
B425068 = a_push_33770.B425069,
B425069 = a_mov_33771.B42506c,
B42506c = a_mov_33772.B42506e,
B42506e = a_sub_33773.B425072,
B425072 = a_call_33774.call B407550.B425077,
B425077 = a_mov_33775.B42507a,
B42507a = a_call_33776.call B408220.B42507f,
B42507f = a_test_33777.B425082,
B425082 = a_je_33778.B425138 + a_alt_je_33779.B425088,
B425088 = a_mov_33780.B42508b,
```

## Set of Algebra Behavior Actions


```
a_push_33766 = Operator(1 -> ("x86: action 'push 425060';")
(rip := 4345954)),
a_push_33767 = Operator(1 -> ("x86: action 'push 425062';")
(rip := 4345956)),
a_mov_33768 = Operator(1 -> ("x86: action 'mov 425064';")
(rip := 4345959; r13 := rsi)),
a_push_33769 = Operator(1 -> ("x86: action 'push 425067';")
(rip := 4345960)),
a_push_33770 = Operator(1 -> ("x86: action 'push 425068';")
(rip := 4345961)),
a_mov_33771 = Operator(1 -> ("x86: action 'mov 425069';")
(rip := 4345964; r12 := rdi)),
a_mov_33772 = Operator(1 -> ("x86: action 'mov 42506c';")
(rip := 4345966; ebp := edx)),
a_sub_33773 = Operator(1 -> ("x86: action 'sub 42506e';")
(rip := 4345970; rsp := rsp - 8; ZF := (rsp - 8 = 0); PF :=
((rsp - 8) = 0); SF := (rsp - 8) < 0))),
a_call_33774 = Operator(1 -> ("x86: action 'call 425072';")
(rip := 4345975)),
a_mov_33775 = Operator(1 -> ("x86: action 'mov 425077';")
(rip := 4345978; rdi := rax)),
a_call_33776 = Operator(1 -> ("x86: action 'call 42507a';")
(rip := 4345983)),
a_test_33777 = Operator(1 -> ("x86: action 'test 42507f';")
(rip := 4345986)),
a_je_33778 = Operator((ZF = 1) -> ("x86: action 'je
425082';") (rip := 4345992)),
a_alt_je_33779 = Operator((~(ZF = 1)) -> ("x86: action 'je
425082';") (rip := 4345992)),
a_mov_33780 = Operator(1 -> ("x86: action 'mov 425088';")
(rip := 4345995; rcx := r13)),
```

# Algebraic Patterns of Vulnerabilities

*VulnerabilityPattern = IntruderInput; ProgramBehavior; VulnerabilityPoint*



# Algebraic Patterns of Vulnerabilities



## **BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY**

*vulnerabilityBufferOverflow = input; X1; allocateStack; X2; writeStack,*

*input = mov(9, eax, 0x66). mov(10, ebx, 0x11). lea(11, ecx, MemoryOperand). call(12, MemoryOperand),*

*allocateStack = push(1,ebp).mov(2,ebp,esp).sub(3,esp,N),*

*writeStack = movs(8, MemoryOperand, MemoryOperand) + mov(5, MemoryOperand, regGen)*

# Algebraic Patterns of Vulnerabilities

## ACTIONS:

*call(12,MemoryOperand) = Forall(i:int, 0<=i<LengthSocket) -> Input(ecx + i) = true,  
mov(2,ebp,esp)=1->StackAddr=ebp,*

*movs(8,MemoryOperand,MemoryOperand) = Input(RefMemorySrc) &&(StackAddr==RefMemoryDest) -> 1,  
mov(5, MemoryOperand, regGen) = Input(RefMemorySrc) && (StackAddr == RefMemoryDest) -> 1,*

*mov(x, GenReg, MemoryOperand) = Input(RefMemorySrc) -> Input(GenReg),  
mov(x, MemoryOperand, MemoryOperand) = Input(RefMemorySrc) -> Input(RefMemoryDest)*

Sufficient conditions of vulnerability:

1. The bytes are written in address that is equal to the top stack pointer;
2. The bytes shall be received from the registers after system call

# Behavior Matching

The first level of matching is to find behavior expressions that will find the behavior corresponding to the algebraic pattern of a vulnerability.

Behavior matching anticipates solving behavior expressions.

The task of solving behavior equations is formulated as follows. Let  $B_0$  be the system of behavior equations:

$$B_0 = R(a_1, a_2, \dots, B_1, B_2, \dots),$$

$$B_1 = R(a_{11}, a_{12}, \dots, B_{11}, B_{12}, \dots), \dots$$

where  $B_1, B_2, \dots, B_{11}, B_{12}, \dots$  are the behaviors and  $a_1, a_2, \dots$  are actions. The behavior  $B_0$  shows translated binary code.

Let behavior  $X$  be an unknown behavior containing a vulnerability. The task is to find  $X$ , that is  $B_0 = Y; X; Z$  and  $X = \text{vulnerabilityBufferOverflow}$

# Model Matching

Model matching is performed by the symbolic modelling of a given behavior that was obtained by behavior matching.

During symbolic modelling, we apply the actions for which we detect the satisfiability of the expression  $Env \ \&\& \ Prec$ , where  $Env$  is a symbolic environment of the model of the binary code and  $Prec$  is the precondition of the matched action.

If it is satisfiable, then we perform the postcondition operations in the pattern environment and in the environment of the binary code model.


If we reach the vulnerability point in the pattern, then we have a scenario that leads from the input point.

# Exploit Generation

With the symbolic environment represented by the set of formulae, it is possible to realize a concrete scenario or to define input values that cause stack buffer overflow.


Backward symbolic modeling to the input point gives the initial formula that covers the values enabling exploits to perform malicious actions.

# Detection of Vulnerabilities in Binary Code





# Analysis of Suspicious Process



# Platform for Detection of Vulnerabilities in Binary Code


- Upload the binary code;
- Disassembling;
- Conversion to behavior algebra;
- Matching for vulnerabilities;
- OPEN for creation the new patterns of vulnerabilities.

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
## **TWO-LEVEL ORGANIZATION IS MORE EFFICIENT:**

- Reduce the time of matching;
- Reduce the number of FALSE POSITIVE;
- The accuracy is high

- Safety conditions
- Macros
- Basic protocols
  - Insert\_Coins
  - Make\_Drink
  - Press\_Cancel
- Behavior
  - CoffeM\_Work
- Events
  - Cancel\_Button
  - Insert\_Coin
  - Prepare\_Drink
- Logic formula
- Charts settings
- C code
- Experiment settings
- Results



```
Text View CoffeM_Work
1 SP=Insert_Coins.B0,
2 B0=Press_Cancel.SP+B1,
3 B1=SP+B2,
4 B2=Make_Drink.(Delta+SP)
```



Minimized windows

Events

- Prepare\_Drink
- Insert\_Coin
- Cancel\_Button
- CoffeMachine

Name: Cancel\_Button



Parameters:

console

Console Find Errors Debug

Saving project...  
Saved!  
connected  
task compiling...  
run task, 303  
All attributes was detected as concrete  
Concrete values statistic:

- Make\_Drink
- Press\_Cancel
- Behavior
  - CoffeM\_Work
- Events
  - Cancel\_Button
  - Insert\_Coin
  - Prepare\_Drink
- Logic formula
- Charts settings
- C code
- Experiment settings
- Results
  - verdictST0001.mpr
  - verdictST0002.mpr
  - verdictST0003.mpr
  - verdictST0004.mpr



Verdict	Charts	MSC	Environ
Number of traces leading to Successful Termination states: 18 (Saved: 18)			
Number of traces leading to goal trace: 0 (Saved: 0)			
Number of traces leading to failed test: 0 (Saved: 0)			
Number of traces leading to visited states: 37 (Saved: 1)			
Number of traces leading to unknown: 0 (Saved: 0)			
Number of traces leading to deadlock: 0 (Saved: 0)			
Number of traces leading to cycle: 0 (Saved: 0)			
Number of traces leading to maximum of protocols: 0 (Saved: 0)			
Number of traces saved in interactive mode: 0			
Total number of stored states: 0			
Total number of traces: 55			
Time of generation: 0:0.064s			
Completion reason: All traces explored			
List of not applied Basic Protocols (0/3):			
Number of every basic protocol application:			
Insert_Coins:56			
Make_Drink:18			
Press_Cancel:19			

Minimized windows

Events

nk | Insert\_Coin | **Cancel\_Button** | CoffeMachine | User

Name: Cancel\_Button

Parameters:

console

Console | Find | Errors | Debug


Saving project...  
Saved!  
connected  
task compiling...  
run task, 297  
All attributes was detected as concrete  
Concrete values statistics:

**THANK YOU FOR ATTENTION**

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